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Abstract
The firm-specific human capital dilemma suggests that firms generally want employees to
make firm-specific investments but that employees prefer not to make them. We suggest that
individual performance may moderate this dilemma such that the dilemma increases as
individual performance increases – i.e. firms may prefer high performers in firm-specific
roles while high performers may resist these roles more than their lower performing
counterparts. We examine our extended firm-specific human capital theory in a context
where the classic firm-specific human capital dilemma likely exists: business academia.
Using a unique dataset of 4,164 business school professors from 39 of the top 100 US
business schools, we examine how research performance affects propensity to become an
Associate Dean and their compensation increases when taking on these roles. Even though
AD roles come with a significant pay increase, we find that higher performing individuals are
less likely to become ADs. Surprisingly, we find that lower performers receive higher pay
increases when taking on these roles. We conduct exploratory interviews to understand this
surprising finding and discuss implications and opportunities for future research.
*Equal co-authors listed alphabetically for convenience
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Who Should Become a Business School Associate Dean?
Individual Performance and Taking on Firm-Specific Roles
Strategy theory implicitly assumes that firms want all employees to make firm-specific
investments and that all individuals resist making firm-specific investments (Hoskisson,
Gambeta, Green, & Li, 2017; Mahoney & Kor, 2015; Wang & Barney, 2006). This classic firmspecific human capital dilemma may be particularly acute in firms where taking on firm-specific
roles represents a trade-off to making general investments that might increase one’s external
marketability (Løwendahl, Revang, & Fosstenløkken, 2001; Gubler & Sax, 2019). However, we
know that employees vary widely in quality and contribution (Lepak & Snell, 1999).
Considering performance heterogeneity, would we expect this dilemma to be uniformly salient
for all employees? What if there are contexts where the classic firm-specific human capital
dilemma becomes more pronounced for high performing individuals?
On the firm side, managers may prefer high performers for firm-specific roles because their
high performance on professional tasks signals that the individual will likely perform well in a
firm-specific role (Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Lee et al., 2004; Nyberg, 2010). On the individual side,
high performers may be more resistant to taking on firm-specific roles because of the higher
expected payoffs from general investments as opposed to firm-specific investments (Morris,
Alvarez, & Barney, 2020). If so, then in some contexts individual performance on general human
capital related tasks may moderate individual resistance to making firm-specific investments and
taking on firm-specific roles. Unfortunately, we lack both explicit theory and empirical research
examining the extent to which individual performance affects this dilemma.
In this paper we examine the relationship between individual performance and the likelihood
that an individual will take on a firm-specific role in the context of business school associate
deans. We theorize that business schools generally prefer faculty with higher research
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productivity in associate dean roles (with some potential exceptions we will discuss in detail),
but that these same faculty will resist these roles more than their lower performing colleagues.
Thus, we theorize that the classic firm-specific human capital dilemma increases with individual
research productivity in academia. To test our theory, we examine a unique data set of 4,164
business school professors from 39 of the top 100 US business schools and examine who is most
likely to take on the role of Associate Dean (AD) – our operationalization of a firm-specific role.
Consistent with our expectations, we find that individuals with high research productivity are
less likely to become ADs and faculty are paid a salary premium to take on these roles.
Inconsistent with our expectations, however, we find that highly productive research faculty
receive smaller compensation increases when becoming ADs than their average research
productivity AD peers.
To better understand this unexpected result, we conducted qualitative exploratory interviews
with a sample of current and former ADs and deans. The qualitative responses suggest that a
university’s formal compensation structure and/or informal equity pressures may constrain AD
pay such that high performing (and earning) faculty have a smaller pay increase moving into AD
roles than lower performing (and earning) peers. These qualitative results regarding our second
hypothesis shed additional light on our first hypothesis – i.e. the relatively smaller financial
rewards for high performing faculty to become ADs may partially explain the lower likelihood of
high performers becoming ADs. We explore the implications of our findings in detail in our
discussion section and provide a rich discussion of when the idiosyncrasies of academia may
(and may not) generalize to other human capital-intensive contexts.
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ACADEMIA AND THE FIRM-SPECIFIC MANAGERIAL DILEMMA
Classic firm-specific human capital theory predicts that employees resist firm-specific
investments because they cannot take these investments to other firms, making firm-specific
investments inherently risky (Hoskisson et al., 2017; Mahoney & Kor, 2015; Wang & Barney,
2006; Wang, He, & Mahoney, 2009). If employees want to change jobs (e.g., to be closer to
family, to avoid being mistreated by an employer, etc.), they must leave their firm-specific
investments behind. General human capital, in contrast, has almost no risk for employees
because they can take and apply it anywhere. Thus, according to the firm-specific human capital
tradition in strategy research, employees tend to prefer general over firm-specific investments.
While strategy scholars have recently called into question the extent to which such a dilemma
may exist in practice given the extreme assumptions (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Coff
& Raffiee, 2015; Morris, Alvarez, Barney, & Molloy, 2017), Kryscynski and Ulrich (2015)
suggest that academia may be one of the contexts in which the core economic assumptions of
firm-specific human capital theory may hold: “Ironically, in all of our combined work we find
only one context where [the core economic assumptions] seem to hold in any consistent way:
business school faculty” (page 362). While we suspect that there are other important contexts
that also match the theoretical assumptions of traditional firm-specific human capital theory, we
agree that business academia (and academia in general) fits the core boundary conditions quite
nicely. Table 1 illustrates some of these classic assumptions and their matching to academia.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Within academia, there seems to be a clear tradeoff between research tasks that increase a
faculty member’s external market value and institution-specific tasks that may or may not
increase internal promotion opportunities but rarely increase external marketability. Accordingly,

4

individual faculty may benefit more from investing in their research productivity than taking on
roles that require firm-specific investments that detract from research.
The challenge, of course, is that just as firms require firm-specific investments to support
their underlying competitive capabilities (Kor, 2003; Mahoney & Kor, 2015), academic
institutions need faculty to make firm-specific investments to support their institution-specific
programs. Mahoney and Kor (2015) identify three key types of firm-specific human capital that
are likely important for academia as well as industry. First, the experiential knowledge of the
firm’s idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. In academia this may include understanding the
nuances of educational programs, how they operate, and the critical elements of success for those
programs. This may also include understanding the complex and often non-intuitive
bureaucratic processes that underlie approvals and decisions. A second type of firm-specific
investment involves the collective shared knowledge of employees and their strengths and
shortcomings. This may include knowing the personalities and tendencies of idiosyncratic and
highly opinionated faculty and knowing how to engage the right political processes to build
coalitions for initiatives. Third, the explicit and tacit knowledge of the firm’s key stakeholders
may be particularly important in academia because of the heavy reliance on donors. Deans and
associate deans need to know which stakeholders to please in order to ensure consistent
fundraising success and financial viability for academic programs.
Thus, there are a host of firm-specific investments that universities need faculty to make in
order to achieve their organizational objectives while faculty may generally resist these
investments. This makes academia a highly appropriate context when testing and extending
classic theory regarding firm-specific human capital dilemma. In other words, academia allows
us to test whether our extended firm-specific human capital dilemma theory holds in a context
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where the classic firm-specific human capital dilemma is likely to occur. We explore later the
extent to which evidence from this context may generalize to other contexts and, therefore, the
extent to which our work implies a general theory of performance as a moderator of the classic
firm-specific human capital dilemma.
WHY THE DILEMMA INCREASES FOR PRODUCTIVE FACULTY
Applying classic firm-specific human capital theory to academia implies that institutions
want faculty to make firm-specific investments that faculty prefer to avoid, ceteris paribus. This
conclusion from extant theory is illustrated as the dashed lines in Figure 1 below – i.e. there is a
gap between the firm’s desire for individuals to make firm-specific investments and the
individual’s willingness to make these investments. Much of the research on the firm-specific
human capital dilemma has focused on ways that firms can close this gap and motivate
employees to make these firm-specific investments (Wang & Barney, 2006; Wang et al., 2009;
Wang, Zhao, & Chen, 2017; Wang, Zhao, & He, 2016). But perhaps not all employees are
equally resistant. The managerial dilemma described above may be particularly pronounced for
the most productive research faculty (high performers) because universities may prefer to have
high performers take on firm-specific roles and because high performers may be more resistant
to making these investments (see Figure 1).
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Universities Want Research Productive Faculty to take on Firm-Specific Roles
Research on high performers, and notably individuals with strong general human capital,
suggests at least three reasons why organizations typically want high performers to make firmspecific investments. First, organizational decision makers likely fall prey to “halo effects” in
their human capital decision making – i.e. decision makers may assume that those who
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demonstrate competence in one professional domain may also be competent in new domains
(Sorcher & Brant, 2002). Their assessments might be correct in this case because high
performance in general human capital tasks usually provides the “aptitudes, attitudes, and skills
that contribute to the stock of firm-specific human capital that serves the specialized needs of the
company” (Hatch & Dyer, 2004: 1173). Regardless of whether or not individual skills may
actually transfer across domains, decision makers may still believe that they do and, accordingly,
may have strong preferences for high performers in one domain to take on new roles in new
domains. In academia this may manifest itself as deans consider highly research productive
faculty as being smart, capable, hard working and competent and, therefore, strong candidates
for associate dean positions.
Second, organizations may identify high performing knowledge workers as experienced and
successful professionals to whom others can turn for help and advice (Olroyd & Morris, 2012)
and, accordingly, organizations may want these individuals in leadership roles where they can
model success and mentor others to achieve similar successes. This may be particularly relevant
in academia where faculty are rewarded for becoming thought leaders in their fields. Universities
may benefit from having experienced and successful thought leaders in firm-specific roles such
as department chairs and associate deans because they can model success for others and can
presumably secure needed resources for other faculty to become more successful.
Third, the organization typically expects that it will get more value from a high performer
than a low performer from a firm-specific investment (Morris, Alvarez, Barney, & Molloy,
2017). This is because a high performer who has high levels of general human capital is likely to
be more efficient at learning, and therefore contributing, in a firm-specific role (Ployhart,
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Iddekinge, & Mackenzie, 2011). Thus, decision makers may expect a faster adjustment cost
when high performers on general human capital related tasks take on these firm-specific roles.
Of course, there may be some exceptions. Some highly productive faculty may also be highly
caustic individuals or may not have the patience to focus on administrative tasks. These
individuals may simply lack the human or social capital required for administrative roles.
Additionally, research stars may be so valuable to the university in their research roles that deans
prefer to protect them from administrative roles. While these exceptions certainly exist, we
suspect they are indeed the exception rather than the rule.
In general, if firms believe that they will benefit more by having high performers in these
firm-specific roles, then the firm’s desire to put someone in one of these roles likely increases
with individual performance. This is shown as the upward sloping firm line in Figure 1, and
notably departs from the classic expectations in firm-specific human capital theory. Inasmuch as
universities, like other human capital-intensive firms, find that their high performers generally
perform well on multiple dimensions, they may want their more productive research faculty to
take on firm-specific administrative roles. Accordingly, the university is more likely to select
faculty who are high performers on research to take on firm-specific roles.
Research Productive Faculty Resist Making Firm-Specific Investments
But while a university may benefit more from higher performing faculty taking on firmspecific roles, faculty resistance to these roles may also increase with productivity. There are at
least two reasons why high performers may resist firm-specific investments more than their
lower performing counterparts: (1) they have higher potential payoffs from their research
investments and (2) they have higher mobility risks. We discuss each in turn.
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High performers generally have higher opportunity costs than lower performers when taking
on firm-specific roles. The most productive faculty members may produce multiple top tier
publications per year. In contrast, lower performing faculty may have no top tier publications.
Thus, the ratio of top tier publication to research effort is likely much higher for the high
performing faculty. When taking on a firm-specific role, such as becoming an associate dean,
faculty sacrifice large chunks of research time to focus on new administrative tasks. This means
that, all else equal, high performing faculty sacrifice more publications to take on these roles
than their lower performing colleagues. Since research productivity is often the most important
indicator of a faculty member’s value to the university (and is often linked to compensation),
faculty will avoid activities that detract from research productivity. If so, then high performing
faculty sacrifice more in both publications and in future potential earnings by taking on firmspecific roles.
High performers also likely have lower probabilities of realizing the potential payoffs from
firm-specific investments because they have higher mobility risk than low performers. Since
these are high performers on highly transferrable tasks, they are highly visible to the external
labor market (Aguinis, Suárez-González, Lannelongue, & Joo, 2012). This is true for similar
professions with highly visible performance such as star analysts (Groysberg & Lee, 2009), star
professional athletes (Chen & Garg, 2018; Ethiraj & Garg, 2012), star scientists (Hess &
Rothaermel, 2011, Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014), and so forth. In academia, high performers are
likely to get more solicited and unsolicited job offers from other universities than low
performers. Thus, high performers are generally more aware of their mobility than low
performers (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008) and more likely to leave than their lower
performing counterparts (Kang, Oldroyd, Morris, & Kim, 2018).
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These arguments suggest that high performers may be more resistant to taking on firmspecific administrative roles than their more average performing peers. This is illustrated as the
downward sloping employee willingness to make firm-specific investments line in Figure 1.
Given this relationship, we expect that the likelihood of taking on an AD role generally decreases
with increasing research productivity. This implies the following formal hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A faculty member’s probability of taking on a firm-specific administrative
role is negatively related to that individual’s research productivity.
Our logic so far suggests that the firm-specific human capital dilemma is more pronounced
for high performers. As illustrated in Figure 1, the gap between the university’s desire for
individuals to make firm-specific investments and individual willingness to make these
investments increases as performance increases. If so, then universities may seek to persuade
high performers to take on firm-specific roles through some additional compensation or
inducements (Andersson, Freedman, Haltiwanger, Lane, & Shaw, 2009). As pointed out by
Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart and Carpenter (2010), pay increases are important in motivating
employee behavior. This is especially relevant to high performers, as they tend to be more
satisfied with a strong performance-pay link than their lower performing peers (Nyberg, 2010).
For instance, increased pay offers greater vindication for the high performer’s sacrifice in
making firm-specific investments and provides justification for their potentially high levels of
future performance (Nyberg, Pieper, & Trevor, 2016). While increased pay for becoming an
associate dean may not be the same as paying someone for a specific measure of performance, it
represents a monetary reward for a new position that a person has “earned” or will likely earn in
the future (Shaw & Gupta, 2007). Hence, increased compensation may be a way of validating
what may be seen as a potentially difficult investment decision for a high performing professor
who is creating value through research publications.
10

Moreover, the classic human capital literature identifies several ways that firms may
persuade individuals to make firm-specific investments such as relational governance (Wang et
al., 2009), increased job security (Wang et al., 2017), takeover protections (Wang et al., 2016)
and even diversification (Wang & Barney, 2006). In the university setting, administrative roles
may offer both financial and non-financial forms of compensation. Assuming universities can
fluidly adjust their inducements based on their human capital needs, they are likely to offer
greater total inducements to their high performers to persuade them to make firm-specific
investments and take on firm-specific roles.
Hypothesis 2: High productive faculty receive higher total compensation increases when
taking on firm-specific administrative roles than lower research productive faculty.
METHODS
We study faculty taking on firm-specific roles by examining associate deans in business
schools. We obtained individual level data on salaries, tenure, and administrative positions from
the records departments, HR departments and/or online public databases for 4,162 professors
from 39 of the top 100 U.S. business schools (as ranked by U.S. News and World Report in
2016) for a total of 37,206 professor-year observations (roughly nine years of salary observations
for each professor, on average). 1 Our sample roughly covers 1990-2017. We removed assistant
professors and professors with no salary data, or inaccurate salary data (the main results use a
cutoff of $30k in total compensation to preserve as much data as possible, but our findings are
robust to using $50k, $75k and $100k cutoffs as well). We supplemented the salary data through
several additional data harvesting efforts involving research assistants and redundant simple
assignments for Mechanical Turk workers to find details such as PhD completion year, the
department of the professor, etc. We classified professors as being part of one of the following
For all universities, this public data is available for all academics to access. While some of the data is widely
published online, other data is a bit more difficult to obtain and needs to be requested by the individuals.
1
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departments: accounting (14%), economics (9%), finance (14%), information systems (8%),
management (31%), marketing (17%), and operations (7%). We also collected publication data
from SCOPUS and Web of Science. We queried all publications for each professor and retained
only peer-reviewed publications for analysis. After data cleaning we end up with a final sample
of 1,639 professors for 14,651 professor-years in the final sample.
Empirical Approach
We test hypothesis 1 using a logit model predicting whether an individual was an AD in a
given year using an interacted school-year fixed effect. In this case we wanted to model between
person comparisons within the unique school-year combinations in the sample. We test
hypothesis 2 using OLS with fixed effects for individual and year. For these models we wanted
to examine the within individual effect of becoming an AD on salary. The individual fixed
effect accounts for any time invariant individual level unobservables that might affect the
relationship between becoming an AD and compensation. For example, individuals who aspire
to be ADs or full Deans may be less resistant to taking AD positions. If professor career
aspirations are stable through the observation period then the individual fixed effect should
account for these unobservable differences in individual motivations to accept AD positions.
The year fixed effect similarly accounts for any unusual annual trends.
Measures
Firm-specific Administrative Role. The key proxy for a firm-specific administrative role is
whether the individual is an associate dean, AD, in any given year. This variable takes on a
value of one in any year where the individual serves as an AD and a value of zero otherwise. We
hand collected data on all Associate Deans from all the schools in our sample and used their CVs
to identify and code their years of service in AD positions. Like many firm-specific
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administrative roles, becoming an AD requires that the person engage in new tasks that involve
an investment in firm-specific knowledge. While some of the AD role includes general human
capital, we have several reasons to believe many aspects of the AD position make it a highly
firm-specific role.
First, ADs themselves report that becoming an AD is an example of a highly firm specific
investment. We interviewed 10 ADs as part of an exploratory research effort and all but one
explicitly described their AD work as university-specific service and unlikely to increase their
mobility or general marketability. They described investing in understanding bureaucratic
processes at their universities which are often highly idiosyncratic, learning who knows what
within the university (e.g. knowing who manages different centers and programs on campus),
learning the specifics of how their academic programs meet accreditation standards, learning
who the relevant outside stakeholders are and how to appease them, and so forth. Thus, ADs
describe the acquisition of firm-specific knowledge as a critical part of their AD role.
Second, there is a clear tradeoff between research productivity and the AD role. ADs
frequently reported that they were at least temporarily sacrificing their own research productivity
in order to serve the school. Indeed, we tested these assertions by examining the forward
research productivity of ADs for several time windows after becoming ADs. These results (see
Table OA1-1 in Online Appendix 1) indicate that ADs have significantly lower forward research
productivity.
Third, we see no evidence in these data that becoming an AD increases mobility. We
examined a linear probability model predicting mobility to another school using an individual’s
prior service as an AD as the key predictor (see Table OA1-2 in Online Appendix 1). Results
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show that individuals who have served as ADs are significantly less likely to move schools: AD
investments do not increase mobility.
Fourth, becoming an AD does not seem to be purely about an administrative career choice.
Only 9 of the 111 ADs in our sample ever became full Deans and only 13% overall stayed in
administrative roles after serving as ADs. While these data imply that some people become ADs
with the hope of pursuing a dean position, they also show that a small percentage of these ADs
end up becoming deans. Moreover, as we discuss below with our qualitative work, ADs
generally report that they prefer not to take on these roles or stay in these roles.
Compensation. For hypothesis 2 the main dependent variable is log of annual salary,
measured as the natural log of the professor’s annual financial compensation. Across all years,
the mean salary is $176K with a minimum of $32K and a maximum of $631K. Consistent with
prior research, salaries are logged to adjust for any skew in the distribution. Most universities
report a nine-month base salary, but a few report total annual compensation (including summer
support), which we address through a school fixed effect.
Performance. We proxy for performance on general human capital tasks using a cumulative
count of a professor’s Financial Times 50 (FT50) publications. In general, individuals with more
FT50 publications will be viewed as high research performers within their institutions. Since
FT50 publications affect overall business school rankings, business schools generally tend to
incentivize publications in these outlets and consider them top tier publications.
Controls. In addition to “individual”, “school” and “year” fixed effects (fixed effects used
differ depending on the model) we include a number of controls. Leaving in Next Year is a
dichotomous variable that captures whether this is the individual’s last year in that institution. In
other words, if the person will leave our data for this institution in the following year this
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variable is coded a one, but zero otherwise. Experience represents the years of experience since
the professor completed the PhD. Full Professor is a categorical variable indicated as a 1 for a
professor being a full professor in that year and a 0 otherwise. We include dummy controls for
Administrator which is coded as 1 for any professor serving as a department- or program-level
role such as program director or area chair in the prior year (higher level admins such as
provosts, chancellors, etc. are excluded because they are not typically at risk of becoming ADs).
Department is a categorical variable which captures the professor’s department membership.
RESULTS
Variable means and correlations are shown in Table 2.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 presents the results related to hypothesis 1. Models 1-3 use a logit model. Model 1
is a controls-only baseline model. Model 2 includes our professor performance measure and
suggests that as performance increases the likelihood of becoming an AD decreases. Model 3 is
a stripped-down model verifying that the results are not likely driven by overfitting. The
interpretation of Model 2 is that a one unit increase in performance (or one additional FT50
publication) decreases the odds of becoming an AD by 6.2% (e-0.064). Models 4-6 are constructed
in the same format (controls only, full model, no controls) using OLS. Both the logit and LPM
models are consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1.
Table 4 contains the main results for hypothesis 2. Model 1 is a controls-only model. Model
2 adds the dummy variable for whether the individual is an AD in that year. Model 2 shows a
positive and significant relationship between being an AD and salary, generally supporting the
core economic logic of Wang and Barney (2006) – i.e. universities seem to pay people to take on
firm-specific roles. Model 3 adds a control for the performance level of the professor to ensure
15

that our AD finding is not artificially driven by professor research performance. The coefficient
on our AD variable remains positive and significant. The interpretation in this fully specified
model is that an individual, on average, has a 21.7% (e0.196) higher salary when an AD than when
not an AD. This corresponds to approximately $38.1K in annual salary on average. Note also
that the coefficient on performance is positive and significant, suggesting that higher research
productivity correlates with higher compensation. Importantly, the coefficient translates to
approximately $1.7K in compensation increase per FT50 publication per year at the margin. In
other words, this means that becoming an AD is approximately 22 times more financially
beneficial to an AD, on average, than publishing one more FT50 article. Since the typical AD
only loses around one publication during their AD service (see online appendix tables) this
means that the AD compensation increase is multiplicatively more than would be required to
compensate for lost research productivity.
Model 5 shows a stripped-down model to examine overfitting concerns. The coefficient
estimate for AD is positive and statistically significant suggesting that the core finding is not a
result of overfitting in this context. The controls reduce rather than create the positive
relationship in the main model. These results are consistent with our theoretical expectation that
individuals will receive higher compensation when taking on firm-specific roles.
Model 4 adds the interaction between professor performance and serving as an AD. The
coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Our hypothesis predicted a positive and
significant interaction, meaning that as performance increases the salary bump for becoming an
AD would also increase. This result is exactly the opposite. As performance increases the salary
bump for being an AD decreases. Model 6 is a stripped-down model that affirms that this is not
due to overfitting in this context. The gap between AD and non-AD is greatest at the lowest end
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of the performance range and smallest (and no longer statistically different) at the highest end of
the performance range (See Figure 2). To put this in perspective, the average salary increase for
becoming an AD at the 25th percentile of performance is $34.4K and the average salary increase
for becoming an AD at the 75th percentile of performance is $31.4K. Thus, the pay increase
associated with becoming an AD at the 25th percentile is 9.6% higher than the pay increase
associated with becoming an AD at the 75th percentile. This finding is opposite our theoretical
prediction that higher performers will receive higher compensation for making firm-specific
investments.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE]
Robustness Checks
Matching Models. One might be concerned that those who become ADs systematically
differ from those who never become ADs, so we used nearest neighbor matching to create a
matched sample to our ADs. Results are consistent with our main findings and are included in
the online Appendix in Tables OA1-3 and OA1-4.
Alternative Performance Measures. While we believe the FT50 cumulative count is a strong
proxy for research productivity, we acknowledge that publication counts may not appropriately
account for research impact. Thus, we constructed a composite performance measure that
incorporates both publication count and impact through citations. Results are consistent with our
main findings and are included in Table OA1-5 in Online Appendix I.
Fixed Effects Specifications. Our main models include school and year fixed effects for
hypothesis 1 and person and year fixed effects for hypothesis 2. We wanted to be sure that our
results were not arbitrarily driven by our choice of fixed effects, so we also tested a personschool interaction as a fixed effect and a school-year interaction as a fixed effect for hypothesis
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2. These allow us to control for person specific trends unique to a specific school and school
specific annual trends. Results are substantively identical to our main results. Tables for these
additional results are shown in Online Appendix I Tables OA1-6 and OA1-7.
Compensation Measure Reporting. We used total compensation reported in the salary
databases provided by the universities. As described previously we address any time-invariant
differences in how schools report through school fixed effects. However, we were also
concerned with the possibility that firms use different reporting for different individuals. It is
possible that schools may report nine-month base salary for normal faculty but report total
compensation for ADs. If so, then any increase in compensation associated with becoming an
AD could be a mechanical artifact of a school changing how they report compensation rather
than a substantive change in compensation. There are two reasons to reject this possibility.
First, the largest compensation increases occur for the lowest performing faculty, who are also
the least likely to receive summer support. Moreover, since summer support is typically
distributed in ninths of base salary a ninth for a high performer is larger than a ninth for a low
performer. Thus, if this were the case we would observe a mechanical increase for all professors
and that increase would get larger as performance, and base compensation, increases. Second, if
the increase were mechanical we would see a precipitous drop in compensation when professors
shift out of the AD role back into normal faculty positions. We replicated our main results for
when individuals step out of AD roles and find no significant change in total compensation when
individuals leave AD roles and return to the faculty. These results are available in Online
Appendix I Table OA1-8.
Do High Performers Really Resist More? We cannot observe actual resistance in our
secondary data analysis. We took several steps, however, to verify resistance as a core

18

underlying mechanism for our findings. First, we examined whether high performers experience
a larger decrease in research productivity than low performers when serving as ADs. We
recreated our forward-looking performance analysis using a split sample for the high and low
performers (shown in Online Appendix I in Table OA1-9 and Table OA1-10). Not surprisingly,
the top performers sacrifice significantly more research productivity than low performers. This
supports our logic leading up to H1 that high performers likely sacrifice more when taking on
firm-specific roles.
Second, as part of additional exploratory analysis (described in more detail below), we
interviewed a sample of current and former ADs and deans. These ADs and deans reported both
general resistance to taking on the AD positions and a higher level of resistance by high
performers. One notable quotation from a dean illustrates this well: “In terms of the individual's
willingness to accept the role, research productivity mattered a great deal. I found, in general, a
strong negative correlation between research productivity and willingness to accept the role.”
Overall, the qualitative responses from deans and ADs support the idea that higher performers
are more likely to resist firm-specific roles. While we are cautious about overgeneralizing from
a small sample, we note that individual resistance to AD roles was a very strong theme even in
these small numbers. Thus, our interviews lend support for “resistance” as the core mechanism
driving our results.
Is this More About Opportunity or Resistance? While we argue above that there is clear
evidence for resistance as a central mechanism in our story, we also interviewed 14 former or
current deans from top 100 U.S. business schools to better understand the university’s
perspective. Several deans indicated that in some circumstances they purposefully excluded
individuals from the AD pool based on their performance (quotations shown in Table OA2-1 in
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Online Appendix II). This response is inconsistent with the logic we used when developing our
predictions, so we explored the extent to which it threatens our findings in two ways.
First, nine out of 14 deans (64%) reject the notion that they exclude faculty from AD
consideration due to their research productivity. These deans frequently mentioned that their
pools of quality AD candidates were small and they preferred to let the person say “no” rather
than exclude them. Additionally, 13 of the deans (~93%) indicated resistance and/or getting
turned down when inviting faculty to take on AD roles. Thus, data from this sample suggests
that individual resistance is a more dominant explanation for our results than deans purposefully
excluding high performers from the candidate pool.
Second, those who did mention excluding individuals based on performance noted that this
was “rare” and only applied to unusually high performers. Thus, we explored in our secondary
data whether accounting for the small percentage of disproportional performers in each year
changed our core results. We thus coded stars in each year by identifying the top 90th, 95th and
99th percentile faculty on research productivity. We then repeated all of our analyses by both
removing and controlling for stars. Results (included in Online Appendix I Tables OA1-11 and
OA1-12) are consistent with the results presented in the main analysis. Thus, it appears our
results are not primarily driven by deans excluding unusually high performers.
Exploratory Analysis
We noted previously the surprising finding that ADs with lower research productivity receive
larger pay bumps than higher research productive ADs. To better understand the reasons for this
finding we: (1) conducted semi-structured in-person interviews with 10 ADs/deans, (2) surveyed
20 different ADs/deans about our findings, and (3) surveyed 10 of the 20 ADs/deans above with
a follow-up question about non-financial incentives for ADs.
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First, we conducted semi-structured, exploratory interviews with a convenience sample of 10
individuals who were serving, or who had previously served, as associate deans (See Figure
OA2-1 in Online Appendix II for our interview protocol). We conducted the interviews using a
grounded theory methodology (Glasser & Strauss, 1967), specifically using the constant
comparative method as described by (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995) to extract categories
and themes from the interviews. We recorded and transcribed our interviews in order to
facilitate the extraction of categories and themes. We discontinued the exploratory interviews
when a level of saturation was reached (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Burgelman, 1994).
The interviewees suggested three explanations for the surprising results—compensation
salary bands, equity theory and opportunity costs (several suggested that multiple mechanisms
may be at play simultaneously). After the explanations were drawn from the exploratory
interviews, we briefly described the top three responses in an email (Figure OA2-2 in Online
Appendix II) that was sent to a list of associate deans/deans who were identified as people the
authors knew from a list of the top 100 business schools. We emailed 36 current Deans and ADs
and shared our unanticipated finding and asked them to select, and rank order, those explanations
that they felt best explained the findings, or choose an “other” option with explanation. We
received 20 responses, which included two dominant potential explanations.
Consistent with our exploratory interviews, the most frequently mentioned explanation was
that universities have a set salary band (and typically an upper limit) for the associate dean
position. High performing faculty members are already in or near the limit of that salary band.
In contrast, low performers typically have lower compensation when asked to be an AD so their
salary must be raised by a greater amount to get within the AD salary band. This logic is
consistent with findings in the compensation literature (e.g., Newman, Gerhart, & Milkovich,
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2016). Thus, universities with salary bands for ADs may mechanically depress the upside for
high performing researchers who become ADs while magnifying the upside for low performing
researchers. This was the most mentioned explanation (16 out of 20).
Second, some of our interviewees indicated an equity theory logic for this finding. When
someone becomes an AD they are one of several ADs. Equity theory suggests that these ADs
likely require similar salaries given their relatively similar job roles and title. If one AD is paid
unusually more or less than the others, then there could be social comparison concerns leading to
internal coordination costs (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). This could happen at any university but
may be especially salient in public institutions where salary information is made public by law.
This makes social comparison relatively easy. Moreover, since ADs typically work together and
since they all have the same position title within an internal labor market, it seems equitable to
minimize the variance in their compensation (Adams, 1963). Equity theory argues that
perceptions of inequity cause employees to take actions to restore equity (Gerhart, Minkoff, &
Olsen, 1995). As one dean put it, “Some of it is just an equity thing among your associate deans.
When you bring somebody in, you don't want them to be so far behind... they all know what
they're making.” One of our ADs noted that he had influence over the raises and consistently
recommended that he receive one of the lowest raises in order to preserve equity comparisons
across the team of associate deans. This explanation was supported by 12 out of 20 deans.
While only two of 20 associate deans indicated the possibility that universities may be
compensating highly productive faculty in different ways than the low productivity faculty when
becoming ADs, we felt it worth exploring whether non-monetary awards varied significantly for
associate deans. So we sent emails back to the 20 deans who responded to our survey and asked
them whether ADs at their university typically received standard packages in terms of reduced
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teaching load or increased research funds or whether these packages tended to be customized to
each AD (see Online Appendix II: Figure OA2-3 for the email sent out). We received responses
from 10 deans with 9 responding that non-monetary compensation such as teaching loads (e.g.,
zero or one course for all ADs) for associate deans were largely standard. Thus, while it seems
likely that there are some cases where productive associate deans may receive more non-salary
compensation, this does not seem to be a prevalent practice.
DISCUSSION
Our main results and additional exploratory analysis in this context are consistent with our
broader theory that the firm-specific human capital dilemma increases with individual
performance. In addition to our theory that the dilemma increases with performance, however,
our theory also implies a zone of misaligned incentives. Figure 1 shows a vertical dashed line
indicating the performance level at which firm desires for individuals to make firm-specific
investments and individual willingness to make these investments intersect. To the right of this
point the dilemma increases (zone of increasing dilemma). To the left of this point, however, a
different problem increases – i.e. individual willingness to take on these roles outpaces firm
desires for those individuals to take them on (zone of misaligned incentives). While we did not
explicitly test predictions associated with this zone of misaligned incentives, we note it as a
logical conclusion from the theory. Future research might explicitly test this assertion.
We believe our findings provide useful insights with regard to the firm-specific human
capital dilemma within academia, a large $671 billion industry (NCES, 2020) with over 1.4
million faculty in the United States alone (NCES, 2019). From the individual perspective, our
results suggest that lower performing faculty should seek to become ADs because they will
receive compensation that far exceeds what they could have achieved through their research

23

productivity. High performing faculty also receive inducements to become ADs but at the cost
of reduced productivity. From the university perspective, deans face a tradeoff with regard to
selecting associate deans: high performers might perform better in the role but with a greater cost
of lost research productivity while low performers might not perform as well in an AD role (in
part because they may have less respect from peers and external stakeholders) but with a lower
cost of lost research productivity. Finding lower performing faculty who can be effective in an
AD role seems to be a potentially optimal approach.
While our results in academia are consistent with our core theory, it is important to examine
the extent to which our theory may generalize to other contexts. At a high level it seems that
several aspects of academia are similar to the human capital contexts in other professional
service firms. Prior research has categorized universities and academic institutions as
professional service firms (PSFs) along with health care firms (healthcare R&D and service
firms), management consulting firms, financial service firms, accounting firms and law firms
because their human capital structure is distinct from other types of firms (Hinings & Leblebici,
2003; Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 2006; Malos & Campion, 2000; Swart & Kinnie,
2010). This distinction comes because: (1) the firms’ core or frontline workers (not just
management) are human capital intensive, (2) the firms’ production does not involve significant
amounts of non-human assets, (3) the core workers are professionals with explicit professional
norms (including generally accepted measures of performance) that define appropriate behaviors
(von Nordenflycht, 2014), and (4) core workers possess significant autonomy in how they utilize
resources and invest in their own skills to generate performance outcomes (Barley & Tolbert,
1991; Greenwood et al., 2006; Malhotra, Hall, Shaw, & Oppenhiem, 2006). PSFs are also
similar in that the professionals who do the core work distinguish themselves on tasks requiring
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general human capital, yet these firms also have firm-specific administrative tasks that are done
by professionals who must take on firm-specific roles (see Table 5 for examples of general
human capital tasks and firm-specific roles in different types of professional service firms).
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Despite these similarities, however, there are several highly distinct aspects of academia that
could limit the generalizability of our findings to other professional service firms: (1) job
security, (2) the visibility and transparency of performance, (3) the relative value of general vs.
firm-specific investments and (4) organizational mission (See Table 6). These may reflect
boundary conditions to the applicability of our theory and findings. Accordingly, we discuss
each of these, and their implications for generalizability in how and why firms and their
employees make decisions.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Job Security
First, academia is unique in the widespread use of the tenure system, which provides an
unusually high level of job security to professionals. While high levels of job security are
provided in certain firms and contexts—for example, Japanese firms have long been known to
offer lifetime employment—this unusually high level of job security may limit generalizability
of our findings to PSFs and other firms.
The overall effect of job stability on an individual’s willingness to make firm-specific
investments is somewhat unclear. High job security may decrease employee resistance to making
firm-specific investments because it prevents the firm from behaving opportunistically after an
employee has made firm-specific investments. The underlying logic of individual resistance in
firm-specific human capital theory is that individuals face career risk when making firm-specific
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investments. If, for any reason, individuals need to seek employment at another firm they lose
the value of their firm-specific investments. High job security shifts the risk profile. While the
university could still take advantage of a faculty member after a firm-specific investment by
increasing teaching loads, lowering salary, etc., the downside risk is capped because the
university cannot easily terminate the faculty member. With limited downside risk, individuals
may be less resistant to make firm-specific investments. This is consistent with the findings of
Wang and colleagues (2017, 2016) who found that when firms increase various forms of
executive job security the overall level of firm-specific knowledge increased.
However, since the university cannot easily fire a faculty member, that faculty member has
significant bargaining power in the employment relationship. Accordingly, a faculty member can
easily turn down invitations to take on administrative roles without fear of job loss. A consultant
or lawyer who refuses to take on a service role might be labeled as not being a “team player” and
this label could prevent her from realizing subsequent promotions and/or could lead to
termination of employment. If so, then the baseline resistance to making firm-specific
investments could be higher in academia, despite the fact that high job security should reduce the
risks of taking on firm-specific roles. Given these contrasting views on the effects of job security
on individual resistance, it is difficult to predict whether our findings are generalizable to
employees working in contexts with low job security. Future research is necessary to determine
generalizability to low job security environments.
Visibility and Transparency of Individual Performance Outcomes
Another factor that may influence generalizability is the ability to accurately measure
individual employee productivity or what Ouchi (1979) referred to as the availability of “output
controls.” Output controls refer to the ability of management to measure employee performance
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primarily based on outputs which means that the value creation process need not be known but a
reliable and valid measure of the desired outputs is available.
When an employee and the firm can easily measure employee productivity, the employee has
greater bargaining power to capture the value she creates (Coff, 1999). Under these conditions a
high performing employee may be less likely to take on a firm-specific role which has a clearly
measurable (negative) impact on the employee’s performance on core work tasks. For
exceptionally high performers this information may also create a disincentive for the firm to ask
high performers to take on firm-specific roles because the employee’s lost productivity is readily
apparent to both parties. Outcomes are highly visible and relatively easy to see and assess in
academia. Business schools can measure a professor’s research publications and citations with a
high level of precision and while there is some interdependent team production with co-authors,
the team is typically quite small (two or three individuals).
PSFs differ to some extent on the availability of precise individual output controls due in part
to the extent of team production (co-production) of interdependent work and causal ambiguity in
measuring performance outcomes. Similar to academia, lawyers and doctors/surgeons’
performance can be measured through billings (or cases won or positive surgical outcomes)
which may be easily attributable to individuals in cases where there is little team production.
The same could be said for financial analysts who recommend particular investments and the
performance (ROI) of those investments can be readily measured (note, however, that
Groysberg, Healy, & Maber (2011) found that star analysts’ performance is influenced somewhat
by team production). The ability to measure individual performance appears to be much more
difficult in large law, consulting, and financial service firms where teams of 4-8 individuals
typically work on a project for a client. Performance is the result of greater team production and
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is typically measured as “client satisfaction” which is a less objective measure than a faculty
publication, analyst ROI return, or lawyer or doctor billings. Moreover, consider an attorney
working on a complex case with a team of attorneys. Not only do you have the problem of team
production, but you also have a problem associated with causal ambiguity because many factors
influence the outcome of the case. It is never quite clear whether the outcome is determined
more by the facts of the case or the skill of the attorneys.
Individual output controls are readily available in business schools which suggests that our
results are more likely to be generalizable to PSFs with similar output controls. Future research
may benefit from explicitly varying the level of clarity and visibility in outcome measures to
explore the extent to which it affects individual willingness to accept firm-specific roles.
The Relative Value of Firm-Specific vs. General Investments
Another important factor that may be unique to academia is the relative value of firm-specific
vs. general investments. While faculty publications are important for university ratings and
overall performance, the overall research productivity of the faculty within a college or
university is typically more important than the sustained research productivity of any one faculty
member. This means that asking faculty to sacrifice their own research to serve in administrative
roles that may boost total faculty research productivity may be a relatively easy productivity
tradeoff decision. Our results show that ADs only sacrifice around 1 publication during the five
years following their AD appointment. From the university perspective, this relatively small
sacrifice may be well worth the benefits of getting a capable and competent administrator.
There may be limits to this, however. We noted that some of our deans indicated rare
situations in which individuals were so research productive and had so much external visibility
that they created more value for the university by NOT serving in administrative roles. This is
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likely a star effect, such that universities generally want more productive scholars to take on
firm-specific roles up to a certain point, but then their desires drop off precipitously. In other
words, in the range of normal performers, universities may prefer the high performers to low
performers. But unusually high performing stars may contribute more by continuing to generate
impactful research rather than becoming distracted by administrative duties. If so, then we may
need to amend our firm desire line in Figure 1 to show an increasing firm desire with
productivity up to a point where productivity reaches star level, then a vertical drop to zero
above that productivity level (shown in Figure 3 below). We suspect that our theory holds if the
firm’s perceived value from firm-specific investments is higher than their perceived value from
that individual’s continued investment in general human capital tasks. Once this condition fails,
the firm may no longer desire individuals to take on these roles. We would expect a similar star
effect in other professional service firms, but future research might look explicitly at whether star
performers in other contexts are also excluded from taking on firm specific roles.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Organizational Mission
Lastly, universities are rarely profit maximizing firms. Most universities, and all the
universities in our study, are educational institutions with distinct non-profit missions related to
knowledge creation and education. Profit incentives (e.g., non-profit vs. for profit firms) differ
among professional service firms and may influence employee, and firm, decisions about taking
on firm-specific roles. For example, business schools may be more willing to compensate for
firm-specific investments because they are typically “non-profit” firms pursuing an educational
mission. Since non-profit universities do not have the same financial pressures as “for profit”
firms they may be less inclined to be opportunistic and attempt to take advantage of employees
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who have made firm-specific investments. This may explain why universities pay an ongoing
premium to employees that take on firm-specific roles. For-profit firms might provide an initial
financial inducement to convince an employee to take on a firm-specific role and then may
opportunistically pay less over time because employees in firm-specific roles are less mobile.
Thus, among PSFs, our findings may be more generalizable to non-profit healthcare service
firms which are more like universities with regard to a non-profit organizational mission.
CONCLUSION
Our theory extends prior research on the firm-specific human capital dilemma by suggesting
that the dilemma increases with individual performance. Our findings suggest that while firms
want employees to take on firm-specific roles and employees generally resist taking on these
roles, there is heterogeneity among employees and firms. Some employees (e.g., those with
weaker GHC skills) are better off by taking on firm specific roles and some firms (e.g., perhaps
larger, more prestigious firms with more employees) prefer that some high performing
employees not take on firm-specific roles. Our work suggests a key research question is not
whether individuals resist firm-specific investments, but under what conditions individuals resist
these investments. Thus, it seems important to examine the conditions under which individuals
may be more, or less, likely to resist making firm-specific investments. We believe that human
capital theory will benefit from future research that explicitly examines other factors that may
moderate individual resistance to making firm-specific investments. Finally, while our results in
academia are consistent with our proposed theory, we identified several factors that may limit the
generalizability of our findings and invite future research to explore our theory in different
contexts.
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Table 1: Mapping Traditional Economic Assumptions to Academia
Assumption
Match to Business Academia
Individuals seek utility and make
Faculty generally choose service assignments,
employment and investment decisions in teaching assignments and research activities in
order to increase their personal utility
ways that increase their personal utility
Individuals are generally able to assess
Faculty are generally aware of the relative
the relative payoffs of different
personal returns to service assignments vs.
investment options and choose the
research productivity.
investment options that benefit them the
most
Individuals have a reasonable level of
Tenured faculty can say no to service
discretion over which investments they
assignments with very little formal recourse.
make
Individuals have scarce resources of time Research faculty rarely have “slack” resources
and effort such that any investment
sitting on the sidelines that allow them to take
choice requires a tradeoff – i.e. there is
on new responsibilities without sacrificing
no employee slack energy or effort
some other task or work
Individuals are generally risk averse in
Tenured faculty members are known to be risk
their decision making
averse – as evidenced by their choice to choose
a profession where they can never get fired.
This reveals a significant risk aversion
preference for those who select into tenure.
Note: these typical economic assumptions are embedded in the logical setup for Becker’s (1964)
classic firm-specific human capital theory and Wang and Barney’s (2006) modern interpretation
of the firm-specific human capital dilemma.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Mean
2008.36
0.02

SD
6.06
0.15

Min
1990.00
0.00

Max
2017.00
1.00

1

1 Year
2 AD
0.06***
3 Log of
Annual Salary
12.00
0.39
10.40
13.40
0.67***
4 GHC
Performance
5.15
5.86
0.00
83.00
0.33***
5 Years of
Experience
18.78
8.81
0.00
51.00
0.26***
6 Leaving in
Next Year
0.04
0.02
0.00
1.00
0.03***
7 Full Prof
0.59
0.49
0.00
1.00
0.04***
8
Administrator
0.03
0.18
0.00
1.00
-0.02**
*** p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Number of observations 14,651

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.13***
0.01

0.42***

0.06***

0.33***

0.02**

-0.01
0.08***

0.00
0.38***

0.01
0.16***

0.02***
0.56***

0.00

-0.03***

0.08***

0.02***

0.09***

-0.02***
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0.10***

Table 3: Predicting the Probability of Being an Associate Dean using a linear probability and logit model

(1)

Logit
(2)

4.646***
(0.344)
-0.346
(0.381)
-0.044
(0.202)
0.007
(0.008)
-1.427***
(0.402)

-0.065***
(0.011)
5.119***
(0.354)
-0.408
(0.394)
-0.003
(0.203)
-0.001
(0.008)
-1.393***
(0.399)

GHC Performance
Log of Annual Salary
Leaving in Next Year
Full Prof
Years of Experience
Administrator in Previous Year
Constant

DV = Serving as AD
(3)
-0.019*
(0.010)

Department Controls
Yes
Yes
No
Observations
6,215
6,215
6,215
R-squared
Number of school_year groups
219
219
219
Note: Fixed effects for school*year. Robust standard errors clustered at
school-year level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(4)

OLS
(5)

0.102***
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.004)
0.000*
(0.000)
-0.037***
(0.008)
-1.204***
(0.103)
Yes
13,012
0.023
635

-0.002***
(0.000)
0.116***
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.037***
(0.008)
-1.363***
(0.114)
Yes
13,012
0.028
635

(6)
-0.001**
(0.000)

0.028***
(0.001)
No
13,012
0.000
635

Table 4: Predicting Log Salary using OLS with Person, Year Fixed Effects
OLS with Fixed Effects for Person & Year
(1)

DV = Log of Annual Salary
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.157***
(0.017)

AD
GHC Performance

0.161***
(0.017)

0.196***
(0.025)

0.010***
(0.001)

0.010***
(0.001)

0.056***
(0.004)

-0.006***
(0.002)

-0.017***
(0.004)

GHC Performance * AD
Leaving in Next Year

-0.038***
(0.006)

-0.036***
(0.006)

-0.037***
(0.006)

-0.037***
(0.006)

Full Prof

0.141***
(0.008)

0.137***
(0.008)

0.120***
(0.007)

0.120***
(0.007)

Years of Experience

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

Administrator

0.097***
(0.020)

0.113***
(0.020)

0.110***
(0.019)

0.110***
(0.019)

Year Controls
School Controls
Department Controls
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
14,651
0.819

Yes
Yes
Yes
14,651
0.825

Yes
Yes
Yes
14,651
0.832

Yes
Yes
Yes
14,651
0.832

Note:

*

0.365***
(0.033)

(6)

No
No
No
14,651
-0.090

0.399***
(0.040)

No
No
No
14,651
0.290

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
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Table 5: Applications of our Theory to Other Contexts
Industry

Position

General Human
Capital Tasks
Research skills—
including theory
development, data
analysis, grant
acquisition, writing

Academia

Professor

Consulting

Management
Consultant

Financial
Services

Financial
Analyst

Legal
Services

Lawyer

Legal research—
including analysis
and argumentation to
win cases

Health
Care

Physician

Diagnose and treat
injuries or
illnesses—including
examining patients,
tracking medical
histories, prescribing
medications, and
counseling patients

Client problem
solving—including
structured problem
solving, data
analysis, client
relationships,
presentations
Merger and
acquisition
analysis—including
financial analysis and
deal completion

Firm-Specific Human Capital Tasks
University-specific administration—
including program development, policy
implementation, onboarding and
training, relationships with alumni
donors, knowledge of key stakeholders,
knowledge of faculty members
Firm-specific administration—including
training on firm consulting processes and
tools, resource allocation and
acquisition, culture and internal best
practice development
Firm-specific administration—including
training financial analysts to use
proprietary software, tracking analyst
performance, developing knowledge of
analyst strengths and weaknesses to
determine client project assignments
Firm-specific administration—including
developing relationships with partners
and associates, training associates on
internal firm policies, managing internal
support staff
Health care administration—including
managing and retaining patients,
learning hospital policies and
procedures, using hospital patient care
information systems, training physicians
on hospital policy
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Supporting
Research
Toole &
Czarnitzki,
2009; Zucker,
Darby, &
Armstrong,
2002
Mayer,
Somaya, &
Williamson,
2012;(Morris et
al., 2019)
(Groysberg et
al., 2011;
Groysberg, Lee,
et al., 2008)
Hitt, Bierman,
Shimizu, &
Kochhar, 2001;
Lazear, 2009;
Sherer, 1995
Brown,
Gianiodis, &
Santoro, 2015;
Prendergast,
1993; (Brown
et al., 2015)

Table 6: Boundary conditions of firm-specific investment dilemma
Industry

Job security

Value of firm-specific
vs. general
investments
Medium value
difference—relative
value of making a
firm-specific
investment vs. a
general investment is
low until high
performers become
stars

Organizational mission

Low security—
firm-specific
investments come
with higher risk of
firm opportunism
as employees are
part of an up or out
system

Visibility &
transparency of
performance
High visibility—
general human capital
performance outcomes
are highly visible
because of the
publication model and
present increased loss
of mobility for making
firm-specific
investments
Medium visibility—
general human capital
performance outcomes
are highly visible, but it
is difficult to
disentangle individual
contribution from team
production

Academia

High security—
firm-specific
investments come
with lower risk of
firm opportunism
because of tenure

Consulting

Medium value
difference—relative
value of making a
firm-specific
investment vs. a
general investment is
low until high
performers become
stars

Financial
Services

Low security—
firm-specific
investments come
with higher risk of
firm opportunism
as employees are
part of an up or out
system

Medium visibility—
general human capital
performance outcomes
are highly visible, but it
is difficult to
disentangle individual
contribution from team
production

Medium value
difference—relative
value of making a
firm-specific
investment vs. a
general investment is
low until high
performers become
stars

Legal
Services

Low security—
firm-specific
investments come
with higher risk of
firm opportunism
as employees are
part of an up or out
system

Medium visibility—
general human capital
performance outcomes
are highly visible, but it
is difficult to
disentangle individual
contribution from team
production

Medium value
difference—relative
value of making a
firm-specific
investment vs. a
general investment is
low until high
performers become
stars

Health
Care

Medium security—
firm-specific
investments may
not be as risky as
more profit-driven
organizations, but
still require
continued
performance

High visibility—
general human capital
performance outcomes
are highly visible
because of the
production model and
present increased loss
of mobility for making
firm-specific
investments

Medium value
difference—relative
value of making a
firm-specific
investment vs. a
general investment is
low until high
performers become
stars

High profit
maximizing—firms may
be less likely to
compensate people after
making firm-specific
investments, as such
employees become less
marketable as a result of
their investment
behaviors
High profit
maximizing—firms may
be less likely to
compensate people after
making firm-specific
investments, as such
employees become less
marketable as a result of
their investment
behaviors
High profit
maximizing—firms may
be less likely to
compensate people after
making firm-specific
investments, as such
employees become less
marketable as a result of
their investment
behaviors
Low profit
maximizing—firms may
be more likely to
compensate people for
firm-specific
investments because they
tend not to operate under
a for-profit model
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Low profit
maximizing—firms may
be more likely to
compensate people for
firm-specific
investments because they
tend not to operate under
a for-profit model

Figure 1: Illustrating Expanded Theory of the Firm-Specific Human Capital Dilemma that Incorporates Individual Performance
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Figure 2: Predicted Salary based on Performance Level by AD and non-AD (Visualization of the H2 Interaction)
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Figure 3: Illustrating Potential Star Effect in Expanded Theory
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